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Gavin W. Jones
?
In Asia, migration pressures are likely to remain strong for many years to come 
because of the diverging trajectories of growth of the working age population and the 
vast differences in earnings between the more developed and the poorer countries of 
the region. While trends in education and in employment structure are bound to 
modify the underlying pressures for international mobility, the conclusion that 
migration pressures will remain strong is no longer in doubt.  
1. The demographic transition and population growth rates 
While the countries in East Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia are in different 
stages of demographic transition - mature, intermediate, and early - they are all 
moving inexorably towards the mature stage. Population growth rates in all areas 
have declined dramatically since the 1970s. South Asia now has large areas (mostly 
in India) of below-replacement fertility, and Pakistan finally appears to be moving 
rapidly toward lower fertility levels. Projections indicate the imminent decline of 
population in Japan (expected to set in around 2010) and the Republic of Korea 
(expected to set in around 2015, or even earlier, given the recent collapse in fertility), 
in sharp contrast to the continued massive growth in Pakistan.  
 Table 1. Asia: Current population, growth rates and projected increases 
Projected % increase 
2000-2030
 Population 
(million)
2000
Av. annual 
growth rate 
1970-75
Av. annual 
growth rate 
2000-05 All ages 0-29 
East Asia 1,481 2.11 0.67 12.0 -19.8 
Southeast Asia   520 2.34 1.40 36.7    0.2 
South-Central
Asia
1,486 2.32 1.66 47.5  15.8 
 Source: United Nations, 2003 
Table 1 shows that continued population growth is expected in each major region of 
Asia, but the final column shows that if we look at their population aged under 30, 
substantial declines are expected in East Asia, and near zero growth in Southeast Asia 
over the next 30 years. This is a reflection of population growth momentum related to 
earlier high fertility.  
? Professor and Head, Division of Demography and Sociology, Research School of Social Sciences, 
Australian National University.   The author wishes to thank Ng Kian Boon for assistance in data analysis 
and preparation of many of the tables and graphs in this paper.  
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East Asia 
Like Europe, East Asia is facing the prospect of declining population and extreme 
ageing. How quickly these happen depends on what happens in the world’s most 
populous country, China, where estimates of fertility decline are still a matter of 
lively debate among Chinese demographers.    
Southeast Asia 
Southeast Asia is much more varied than East Asia. Most of the region is moving in 
the direction of below-replacement fertility – Singapore and Thailand are there 
already, Indonesia and Myanmar will probably get there within the next decade. 
However, Malaysia, Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia are moving only slowly 
towards replacement level, and Timor Leste is a very high fertility outlier. The 
significance of continuing rapid population growth in these countries varies. Malaysia 
is relatively wealthy and can deal with the planning implications of such growth with 
equanimity. It is only in the state of Sabah, where migration, much of it 
undocumented, is fuelling the rapid growth, that population growth is posing real 
issues. However, the Philippines is a much larger and poorer population, and 
continuing rapid population there in the context of sluggish economic growth and 
political instability suggests that the Philippines will continue to be a major country 
of origin, and rely heavily on remittances from overseas workers.      
South Asia 
This region is more varied today than most demographic observers would have 
allowed for two or three decades ago. India runs the gamut from states with below 
replacement fertility to those with continuing relatively high fertility. The line 
roughly dividing north from south, stressed by Dyson and Moore (1983), continues to 
be crucial, and seems to indicate the continuing importance of women’s autonomy or 
lack of it in influencing fertility levels. The Muslim countries also show a wide range 
of circumstances. Iran has experienced dramatic fertility decline. Bangladesh has 
surprised with a sharp, but now stalled, fertility decline despite having very early 
marriages; but Pakistan’s fertility is much higher despite much later marriages. 
However, there is now clear evidence of fertility decline in Pakistan after a long 
period during which it was maintained at very high levels, (Feeney and Alam, 2003).  
2. Patterns of fertility and mortality  transition 
The seemingly inexorable downward movement in fertility rates in most countries of 
Asia has been well illustrated by Gubhaju and Moriki-Durand (2003). A modified and 
updated version of the information contained in their paper is shown in Table 2. They 
divide these countries into three groups according to their TFR in 1995-2000: high 
(TFR>5), intermediate (TFR 2.1-4.9) and low (TFR <2.1). The low group typically 
were already lower than most of the others in 1970-75. The intermediate group, into 
which most of the countries fall, typically had TFRs of 5 to 6.5 in 1970-75, and most 
Underlying Factors in International Labour Migration in Asia: Population, Employment and Productivity Trends  3
of them have seen substantial declines since then. The high group did not differ much 
from the intermediate group in initial levels of fertility, but their fertility levels have 
fallen little. The last holdout of very high fertility may be Afghanistan.  
The pattern of fertility decline in India bears further examination. In the southern 
states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu, there has been a spectacular drop in TFR from 
around 5 in the early 1960s to below replacement level in 1998. In the same period, 
women in the northern states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh 
also reported declines, but only from levels above 6 to levels above 4 (Kumar, 2002). 
The family planning program seems to have been influential in initiating the fertility 
decline in most states, but not in Kerala. The fertility decline began in the south at a 
higher level of social development, in terms of indicators such as female literacy rate, 
infant mortality, and female age at marriage, than in the north (Ram and Ram, 2002).  
The challenge in reaching replacement fertility in the northern states is the patrilineal, 
highly stratified and feudalistic class system, with very limited female autonomy 
(Sathar and Phillips, 2001; Dyson, 2002).
The success of the southern states of India in lowering fertility is mirrored by their 
neighbour, Sri Lanka. This predominantly Buddhist nation, noted for its high levels of 
social development and of female autonomy, has also reached below-replacement 
fertility at relatively low levels of income per capita.  
Turning now to mortality, in general, Asia has made enormous strides in lowering 
mortality and improving health (Caldwell, 1999). Table 3 gives the broad trends. 
Even more progress can be hoped for. Ratios of 10 to 1 in infant mortality rates 
between high and low mortality countries can surely be narrowed. What is more, the 
maternal mortality ratio varies even more dramatically between Asian countries.  
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Table 2. Trends in total fertility rates (TFRs) in selected countries in the ESCAP 
region, 1950-1955, 1970-1975 and 1995-2000 
High fertility (TFR = 5.0 or higher) Percentage change Country, territory or 
area 1950-1955 1970-
1975 
1995-2000 1950-1955 to 
1970-1975 
1970-1975 to 
1995-2000 
Cambodia 6.3 5.5 5.3 -12.7 -3.6 
Laos, PDR  6.2 6.2 5.3 0.0 -14.5 
Bhutan 5.9 5.9 5.5 0.0 -6.8 
Pakistan 6.3 6.3 5.5 0.0 -12.7 
Maldives 7.0 7.0 5.8 0.0 -17.1 
Afghanistan 7.7 7.4 6.9 -3.9 -6.8 
Intermediate fertility (TFR = 2.11-
4.99) 
Percentage change Country, territory or 
area
1950-1955 1970-
1975 
1995-2000 1950-1955 to 
1970-1975 
1970-1975 to 
1995-2000 
Vietnam 5.7 6.7 2.5 17.5 -62.7 
Islamic Republic of 
Iran  
7.0 6.4 2.5 -8.6 -60.5 
Indonesia  5.5 5.2 2.6 -5.5 -50.0 
Mongolia  6.0 7.3 2.7 21.7 -63.0 
Brunei Darussalam  7.0 5.4 2.7 -22.9 -50.0 
Malaysia  6.8 5.2 3.3 -23.5 -36.5 
Myanmar  6.0 5.8 3.3 -3.3 -43.1 
India  6.0 5.4 3.5 -10.0 -32.1 
Philippines  7.3 6.0 3.6 -17.8 -40.0 
Bangladesh  6.7 6.4 4.0 -4.5 -38.3 
Nepal 5.8 5.8 4.7 0.0 -19.8 
Low fertility (TFR = 2.10 or lower) Percentage change Country, territory or 
area 1950-1955 1970-
1975 
1995-2000 1950-1955 to 
1970-1975 
1970-1975 to 
1995-2000 
Hong Kong, China 4.4 2.9 1.1 -34.1 -62.1 
Macao, China 5.0 3.2 1.2 -36.0 -62.5 
Japan 2.7 2.1 1.4 -22.2 -33.3 
Republic of Korea 5.4 4.3 1.5 -20.4 -65.1 
Singapore 6.4 2.6 1.6 -59.4 -38.5 
China 6.2 4.9 1.8 -21.0 -63.3 
Thailand 6.4 5.0 1.95 -21.9 -61.0 
Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea 
5.4 4.3 2.1 -20.4 -51.2 
Sri Lanka 5.9 4.1 2.1 -30.5 -48.8 
Source: World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision, Volume I: Comprehensive Tables, (United 
Nations publication, Sales No. E.01.XIII.8)  
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Table 3. Trends in mortality, selected Asian countries 
1960-65 1970-75 1980-85 1990-95 2000-05
(Projected)
Infant mortality rate 
Japan 25 12   7   4   3 
Malaysia 63 42 28 15 10
Thailand 84 66 47 29 20
Indonesia 166 126 89 59 42
Cambodia 140 181 110 91 73
India 157 132 106 78 64
Pakistan 161 142 123 104 87
Life expectancy at birth 
Japan 69.0 73.3 76.9 79.5 81.5
Malaysia 55.7 63.0 68.0 70.7 73.1
Thailand 57.2 61.0 65.0 67.4 69.3
Indonesia 42.5 49.2 56.2 62.6 66.8
Cambodia 43.4 40.3 52.1 55.5 57.4
India 45.5 50.3 54.9 59.9 63.9
Pakistan 45.0 49.0 53.0 56.9 61.0
 Source: United Nations 2003; last column shows projected rather than actual figures.  
Rising expectation at birth in Asian countries, mirrored in the lengthening of 
expectation of life for those reaching 65, has important implications for the length of 
the retirement period and lends weight to pressures to extent the age of retirement or 
do away with such an age altogether.   
3. Fertility trajectories, the growth or decline of the labour force, and the 
economic incentives for labour mobility 
The effect of rapid fertility decline on population ageing is what has attracted a lot of 
attention from planners in East and Southeast Asia. Ageing has proceeded much 
further in Japan than elsewhere in the region (23 per cent aged 65+ in 2005). The 
Republic of Korea will reach that 23 per cent level by 2030. By that year Thailand’s  
proportion of elderly will only have reached 15 per cent, and in China, 14 per cent. 
However, the numbers of elderly in China will rise from 85 million in 2005 to 196 
million in 2030.     
Less attention has been paid to another outcome of sustained low fertility, namely, 
that some countries will face a fall in the absolute size of the labour force if current 
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demographic and labour force trends continue (McDonald and Kippen, 2001). The 
decline in labour force in some countries and rapid growth in others will be likely to 
provoke migratory movements, although the extent to which these occur will of 
course depend on economic conditions and the policy stance of different governments 
towards such movement.   
Demand and supply for labour are out of sync in a number of higher-income Asian 
countries because high economic growth rates are boosting demand for labour but 
demographic realities restrict its supply. The demographic transition in countries such 
as Japan, Korea, and Singapore, along with longer periods spent by the youth in 
school, has reduced the supply of new workers entering the labour force. As shown in 
Table 4, the 1990s and the first half of the 2000-2010 decade saw a dramatic 
shrinkage of the numbers aged 15-24 in Japan and South Korea, and the beginnings 
of a decline in Thailand, Hong Kong and Singapore, although in Singapore the 
numbers are rising again, presumably because of substantial inflows of contract 
workers. At the same time, wide differences in average earnings between countries 
(see Figure 1 and Table 5) and high levels of unemployment and underemployment in 
the poorer countries are contributing to pressures for more migration.    
Table 4. Index of growth in numbers in the working ages, 1990-2030 (1990=100) 
(a) Aged 15-24 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
Japan 100   86   67   64   60 
South Korea 100   87   76   62   50 
Singapore 100   89 117   99   76 
Hong Kong 100 105   95   85   87 
Malaysia 100 127 148 160 156
Thailand 100   93   90   84   81 
Indonesia 100 112 110 110 107
Philippines 100 124 146 153 152
Laos 100 131 175 204 230
(b) aged 15-64 
Japan 100 101   95   87   82 
South Korea 100 113 119 119 106
Singapore 100 130 155 158 142
Hong Kong 100 120 138 142 135
Malaysia 100 134 169 199 220
Thailand 100 120 133 139 139
Indonesia 100 124 145 163 173
Philippines 100 131 167 201 227
Laos 100 131 175 226 279
Source: United Nations Population Division, 2003  
Underlying Factors in International Labour Migration in Asia: Population, Employment and Productivity Trends  7
Figure 1: Comparisons of year 2000 monthly worker incomes in 7 countries, by 
industry.
Comparisons of Average Worker Income in 
Manufacturing & Construction, by Country
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
Hong Kong,
China
Japan
0
500
1000
Indonesia Thailand Philippines Malaysia Korea, Republic
of
Singapore
Manufacturing Construction
Source: International Labor Organization, 2005
Table 5.
Approximate monthly salaries of trained nurses with 3 or more years’ 
experience, various countries (US$), 2005 
Country Monthly salary   
(US$)*
% of Japanese 
salary
Notes
Japan 2,100   
South Korea 1,500-2,900 Nursing college graduate - after tax 
Singapore 1,500   
Taiwan 580-870 28-41  
Malaysia 390- 475 19-23 $390 in govt., $475 in well-paying 
private hospital    
Thailand 143-285 7-14 
Philippines 189-283 9-13 
Indonesia 100-160 5-8 $100 is golongan 2A in govt.   
India 200 10 
Bangladesh 80-85 4 Government; not much private sector 
in health 
* Includes basic salary plus allowances.   Source: A range of journal and 
newspaper articles, and personal information from knowledgeable informants. 
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Table 6 presents our projections of trends in the labour force of Asian countries, by 
age group, over the 2000-2050 period.  From the table a number of key points 
emerge:  
? If we locate Asian countries along a continuum, from very rapid to declining 
growth of labour force, Japan will be found at the extreme end. Its labour force 
has been declining since 2000, whereas in South Korea and China, the decline is 
not expected to set in until after 2015. During the coming 10 years (2005-2015), 
Japan will be the only large country in Asia that will experience a declining 
labour force.
? If the comparison is made of populations at ages when most enter the labour 
force: 15-24 years, one finds that the phenomenon of declining labour forces is 
however more widespread. Numbers at these ages have been declining over the 
decade of the 1990s in Japan, South Korea, China, and Thailand. They will 
continue to decline over the 2000-2010 decade in all these countries, plus Sri 
Lanka and Indonesia.
? The exceptions are Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and the Philippines, which will 
continue to experience massive growth of their labour force over the coming two 
decades.
? Numbers in the older labour force age groups (45-64) will increase especially 
rapidly. This reflects the earlier broad-based pyramidal age structure and the time 
lag before cohorts who were born as fertility was declining reach these ages. In 
Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Philippines, Malaysia and India, these numbers will 
at least double: in Pakistan and Nepal, by 2025; in Bangladesh and the 
Philippines, by 2030; in Malaysia by 2045 and in India by 2050.  
? While the general trends in labour force growth are clear, the precise growth will 
depend on more complex factors affecting labour force participation rates. For 
example, the decline in the 15-24 age groups will become more rapid because 
extended education will keep many out of the labour force for longer periods of 
time. Also, in many countries, women’s labour force participation rates have been 
steadily increasing. 
? A degree of inverse correlation can be expected between the growth of labour 
force and a country’s admission of labour migrants, as for example Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan. However, the correlation is far from perfect. Despite its fast  
growing labour force (same rate as Philippines and India), Malaysia is drawing in 
migrants.  
? Labour force will increase much faster in India than in China. Over the coming 
decade (2005-2015) India’s population aged 15-64 will increase by 20 per cent, 
but China’s by only 7 per cent. And in the crucial 15-24 year age group, China’s 
numbers will decline by 10 per cent, whereas India’s will increase by 9 per cent.
? There are enormous regional variations in the rate of growth of the labour force 
within both China and India. States of India span the gamut from below-
replacement fertility to still-high fertility. This is likely to mean that internal 
labour migration will be more important than international labour migration for 
these countries.  
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? Complex patterns of internal movement are likely in both countries, but in the 
case of India, there are a number of factors causing “stickiness” in such 
movement, in particular, state policies on recruitment, “sons of the soil” policies, 
and language barriers.
4. Would altering labour force participation rates affect these projections 
much?
In our estimates shown in Table 6 we have assumed that rates of labour force 
participation  will not change. Is this realistic a realistic assumption? There is no 
doubt that changing labour force participation rates can substantially modify the 
apparent growth of the labour force. The issue is whether they are likely to change 
over the coming decades, and whether the change will be big enough to justify 
modifying our earlier projections. 
Male labour force participation rates typically decline at young ages (15-24) as 
education expands and young people stay longer in educational institutions, and at 
older ages (55+ and especially 65+) as agriculture’s share of total employment 
declines and more men are in occupations where retirement is mandatory or 
conventional at certain ages. For females, trends in participation rates are more 
complex, and there can be many offsetting factors. One example is that as women 
move from rural areas, where female participation rates are typically higher than 
average to urban areas, we might expect a decline in overall participation rates, but 
there is often simultaneously a rise in participation rates in urban areas as a result of 
changing urban labour markets, falling birth rates and changing attitudes towards 
women’s roles (Jones, 1984).  
Because female participation rates are lower than for males in almost every country, 
they offer greater scope for increases that might help to offset the projected declines 
in the size of the working age population in some countries.  
To obtain a better idea of what we might expect in the future we examined the 
changes in LFPRs since 1990 using ILO’s data base on labour force surveys. We 
summarize our broad findings in Table 7. We found dramatic changes in LFPRs over 
the period only in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka but these appear to result of definitional 
or procedural changes in labour force surveys rather than real changes. By a large the 
participation rates have been relatively stable in most countries. Detailed analysis 
would be required for each country to sharpen this conclusion, and to isolate actual 
trends in LFPRs and the reasons responsible for them. However, in general our 
assumption seems justified that changes in LFPRs will not significantly affect our 
projections of growth in the labour force.  
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Table 7. Trends in Labour Force Participation Rates, ages 15+, 1990-2004 
Both sexes Males Females 
1990 2000 2004 1990 2000 2004 1990 2000 2004 
Bangladesh 78.6 72.1 57.3** 89.1 87.2 87.4 67.4 55.9 26.1**
Hong Kong 63 60.7 61.3 78.9 73.2 71.7 46.6 49.1 51.9 
India 57.9 58.7  80.4 78.4  33.7 37.7  
Indonesia 63.3 67.9  82.7 84.6  44.6 51.5  
Japan 63.3 62.5 60.4 77.2 76.4 73.4 50.1 49.3 48.2 
S. Korea 60 60.7 62.1 73.9 74 75 47 48.3 49.9 
Philippines 64.5 64.3 66.5 81.8 80.3 82.9 47.5 49.3 50.2 
Singapore 63.1 68.6  79.2 81.1  50.3 55.5  
Sri Lanka 61.5* 55.6 54 77.9 75.7 74.8 45.3* 36.5 34.7 
Thailand 81.9 72.7 73.4 87.7 80.6 81.8 76.3 64.9 65.1 
Source: ILO data base; all data taken from Labour Force Surveys, not Censuses. 
*But years before and after averaged only 57 in the case of both sexes, 36.5 for 
females 
** Clearly affected by changes in definition of female work 
There are two possible exceptions to this conclusion. One concerns age group 15-24, 
from which most first-time labour force entrants are drawn. It was shown in Table 6 
that in many countries, numbers in this age group are already declining, and more 
countries will soon join this group. Trends in LFPRs in this age group appear to be 
exacerbating this trend. In other words, not only are the numbers in the age group 
shrinking, but the LFPR is also declining (see Figure 2) particularly in Hong Kong, 
India, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Thailand. However, in Singapore, there has been 
little change in the LFPRs since the mid-1980s, in Sri Lanka since the mid-1990s, or 
in Thailand since the late 1990s. In Japan and Republic of Korea, there has been no 
detectable trend in LFPR for the 15-24 age group over the entire period. The main 
reason for the decline in the LFPR at these ages, in those countries where it has 
occurred, is no doubt extended schooling.
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Fig 2: Trends in Labor Force Participation Rate,
 ages 15-24,1980-2004
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It is also possible to predict more substantial changes in LFPRs for women. Horton 
(1999) concluded, based on analysis of available labour force surveys (from the 
1960s to 1990s) from Asia, Latin America, North Africa and the Middle East, that the 
increase in women’s labour force participation is associated with a shift of 
employment out of agriculture into other industries and occupations.1  In general, 
female labour force participation rates have risen in the wealthier countries of the 
region  – Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia (see also Okunishi 
2001: 304-308). In Singapore and Malaysia, this was associated with rapid 
industrialization over the 1970s and 1980s (Wong, 1981), but the increases levelled 
off in the 1990s.
1 It is actually quite difficult to trace trends in LFPRs because of the need to follow time trends in data from 
sources using comparable definitions and procedures (e.g. not mixing trends from Censuses and labour 
force surveys). 
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Though their participation rates have been gradually rising, they are still somewhat 
lower than in most Western countries. There is clearly some scope for bringing more 
women into the labour force in these countries, but overall, there does not appear to 
be a great deal of scope for further raising  female participation rates. 
In Japan, the relatively high participation rate for women masks the fact that a high 
proportion of women’s employment is in part-time work. Labour supply could be 
increased further by bringing more of these women into full-time work. There has 
been a substantial increase in the LFPR for females aged 25-29 since the late 1970s, 
and some rise at ages 30-34, but not much change at other ages (Retherford et al., 
2001, Figure 6). The rise at ages 25-34 is linked to the sharp increase in non-marriage 
at these ages, though the causal relationship is not clear. Retherford et al. (2001: 83) 
think the causality runs mainly from trends in LFPR to marriage trends and not the 
other way around).
In the Republic of Korea (see Figure 3), there has been a decline in LFPRs at ages 15-
19  since the early 1980s,  a sharp rise (but later a decline) at 20-24, a spectacular rise 
at age 25-29, a steady rise at ages 30-34, little change at 35-64, and an increase at 
ages 65+. There is little doubt that the decline at age 15-19 is related to extended 
schooling, whereas the rise at ages 20-34 is related to delayed marriage and the 
collapse in fertility, though as in the case of Japan, the direction of causality is not 
clear. One could assume that further increases will take place at ages 20-34 (where 
rates in Korea are still below those in Japan and in most Western countries), but  it 
seems to have levelled off since 1998 suggesting that the rise may have already run 
its course. It is puzzling however why the levelling off of LFPR occurred at just the 
time when fertility was collapsing and marriage delay accelerating. This underlines 
that we really do not understand the causal mechanisms involved, and therefore have 
a very weak basis for predictions.
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Fig 3: Female Labour Force Participation Rates by Age Group, 
South Korea, 1982-2004
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From the foregoing brief assessment of recent trends in LFPRs we conclude that our 
forecast of  labour force growth as presented in Table 6 are unlikely to be greatly 
modified over the next decade or two by changes in LFPRs. One projection should 
suffice to illustrate this point.  Raising the participation rates for females at different 
ages in Korea2 to the maximum reasonable level would lead to the index of labour 
force growth at ages 15-64, rising from 98 in 2005 to just under 100 in 2030, rather 
than falling to 81. This is without allowing for any decline at all in male rates, though 
some decline in these rates at the youngest and oldest ages seems likely.  Such a 
change in projected growth in the Korean labour force does not alter the basic point 
of Table 6, which is that the labour supply in the wealthy countries of the region will 
be stagnant or declining, whereas it will be increasing rapidly in key countries 
potentially supplying labour to these countries.
2 Raising female LFPRs between 2005 and 2030 from 63 to 70 per cent at age 20-24, from 57 to 70 per cent 
at age 25-34, from 62 to 70 per cent at age 35-44, and from 54 to 60 per cent at age 45-64.   
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5. How realistic are the fertility and migration assumptions that underlie these 
projections?
The United Nations projections used above are simply the result of particular 
assumptions. The fertility and migration assumptions are particularly important in 
their effect on the projected growth of the labour force, although the former obviously 
has a delayed impact. In high and medium fertility countries, the United Nations sets 
a total fertility rate floor of 1.85 below which no drop before 2050 is allowed. In the 
case of low fertility countries, projections are made for five or 10 years, after which a 
gradual increase toward 1.85 is projected. These assumptions appear reasonable  
regarding eventual fertility increases in low fertility countries.
In the case of migration, the future path for a given country is based on past 
international migration trends and on its policy. Thus for countries such as Japan and 
Republic of Korea, the projections reflect the past low levels of immigration and the 
likelihood of no major changes in migration policy. In both countries it is clear that 
without large increases in the admission of foreign workers, temporarily or 
permanently,  their labour forces will shrink.   
The very low fertility reached in a number of countries in the region (Japan, Republic 
of Korea, Singapore, perhaps China and certainly its major cities Beijing, Shanghai 
and Hong Kong) appears to result from a number of factors including caution in 
family building as a result of people’s insecurity about (a) their long-term 
employment prospects and (b) the possibility of marriage ending in divorce. Increased 
education and rising female labour force participation rates have increased the 
opportunity costs of raising children for many women. Career prospects and the 
demands placed on women in the workforce highlight rather starkly the trade-off 
between working and raising children. There is no doubt about the pressures facing 
women who want to combine a career and raising a family in countries such as Japan 
and Singapore, given the glacial changes in male attitudes to their role in the 
household and the enormous pressures to produce ‘successful’ children (Retherford, 
Ogawa and Matsukura, 2001; Tsuya and Bumpass, 2004). Consumerism and spread 
of individualism has probably also affected the assessment of the relative attraction of 
raising a family and other alternatives. In China, of course, government policy has 
played a major role in the decline in fertility.   
Consistent with its social engineering approach to many problems over the past 40 
years, the Singapore government announced in August 2004 a new policy for raising 
the birth rate, featuring a raft of measures including increased cash and tax rebate 
incentives for having babies, an extra month of maternity leave (from two to three 
months) paid by government, and increased child care allowances, including a 
reduced maid levy and taxation relief for grandparent care of children. Other 
measures to make Singapore more friendly to families include doing away with 
Saturday work for government servants and measures to make employers more 
understanding of the needs of workers with children. Similarly, in Taiwan (where the 
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TFR has hit a low of 1.2), Japan and South Korea, great attention is being given to 
policy to raise birth rates. The South Korean government in 2006 announced new 
policies to boost birth rates, including monetary incentives such as greater pension 
payouts for families with two or more children, picking up the cost of three months’ 
maternity leave for working women (employers were previously required to pay for 
the second and third month, making them reluctant to hire female workers), and 
working with the Planned Parenthood Federation of Korea and the private sector 
(Lee, 2006).
One element in the sinking of fertility rates to very low levels in some East and 
South-East Asian countries is the “flight from marriage”, because in these societies 
children are rarely born outside of wedlock. The proportion of men and women who 
are still single when they reach their 30s and even 40s has risen sharply. This 
represents one of the most revolutionary social changes in the late 20th century (Jones, 
2004). In the space of less than 2 generations, Asia moved from a tradition of 
universal marriage to a situation where non-marriage rates in some countries are 
amongst the highest in the world. Concurrent trends were rapidly rising levels of 
female education in the region, sharp increases in the proportion of women in the 
formal labour market and abandonment by parents of their traditional role in 
matchmaking, which, from the bride’s perspective, had in reality frequently amounted 
to arranged marriage without her consent. 
Figure 4 shows the trend – for women aged 30-34. The increases at ages 40-44, from 
a lower base, were almost as sharp. Although there were major differences between 
countries, the general trend in proportions remaining single is sharply upwards. 
Delayed marriage and non-marriage has gone furthest in the big cities, and is also 
more common among the better-educated. But non-marriage was not confined just to 
the highly educated. In Bangkok – and even in the much less wealthy population of 
Myanmar – quite a high proportion of the less educated were also remaining 
unmarried. 
The factors responsible for increasing non-marriage are a matter of controversy. (For 
more detailed discussion, see Jones, 2004). Greatest attention is given by most 
commentators to the motivations and constraints affecting women. Priority to career, 
dissatisfaction with the institution of marriage, reluctance to have children, 
prioritization of self-actualization, etc. are all part of the picture. But for men in the 
region, too, the uncertainties of the labour market and the perception that women are 
increasingly demanding change in traditional gender relations may be adding to the 
hesitancy about entering marriage.  
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Figure 4 
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In relation to the current discussion, the key point about trends toward delayed 
marriage in the region is that to some extent it is caused by the same factors that are 
leading to lowered fertility within marriage, and in any case it reinforces the trend 
toward very low fertility in the major labour-scarce countries. .  
6.  Trends in educational composition of the labour force
The potential labour flows between countries will be greatly influenced by 
educational trends in both advanced and poorer countries. For example, Indian 
migration to countries such as the United States, Canada and Australia is highly 
selective by education. It is skilled migrants, including IT workers and those in the 
health sector, who are of special interest to these countries. The same can be expected 
of evolving patterns of migration, either permanent or short-term, to countries such as 
Japan and South Korea. Thus trends in educational expansion in the main migrant-
sending countries of Asia need to be studied carefully, as they will affect the “stock” 
of potential migrants with greater chance of acceptance in international labour 
markets.  
Although a detailed projection of the educational composition of the labour force in 
the various Asian countries is beyond the scope of the present chapter, some relevant 
observations can be made.  
? Although formal educational credentials rarely improve much for a given cohort 
once it has completed formal schooling (despite the lip service paid to out-of-
school education), on-the-job-training can be very important in enhancing the 
job-related skills and employability of such a cohort. In this sense, the skill 
levels of any cohort are not totally determined by the amount of formal 
education received.
? There has been a tendency since about 1990 for educational attainment of 
adolescents in countries such as Thailand, Indonesia and Bangladesh to increase 
more rapidly than is the case in mature Western economies or in Japan and 
South Korea, both because educational attainment levels were already high in 
these mature economies, and because the lagging countries have been putting 
increased effort into raising educational levels. In Asia, secondary school 
enrolment ratios have increased much faster in East Asia (which includes 
Southeast Asia) than in West Asia (which includes the Indian subcontinent) (see 
Unesco Institute of Statistics, 2005, Figure 7). Table 8 shows that sharply 
increasing enrolment ratios at the secondary school ages in Indonesia, Thailand, 
and Bangladesh raised such enrollments over the 1990s, and in India and the 
Philippines, where increases in enrolment ratios were more modest, this modest 
rise, along with increasing numbers in the adolescent age groups, still produced 
a substantial increase in the numbers enrolled in high school. These larger 
numbers of young people with secondary education were then, of course, 
joining the workforce, whereas in Japan and South Korea the numbers enrolled 
in secondary school were falling, because “saturation enrolment” had already 
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been reached at this level of education, and the numbers in these age groups 
were also falling.
Table 8.  Rise in secondary school enrolments 1990-2000, various Asian 
countries
Country Enrollment 
rate 1990
Enrollment 
rate 2000 
Enrollments 
1990
(million) 
Enrollments 
2000
(million) 
Ratio of 
enrollments 
2000/1990
Indonesia 45 57 11.7 14.9 1.27 
Thailand 32 82   2.3   5.6 2.37 
Philippines 73 77   6.4   7.9 1.23 
India 44 49 47.0 61.8 1.31 
Bangladesh 19 46   3.1   8.9 2.90 
Japan 96 100   9.4   8.4   .90 
S. Korea 87 91   4.3   3.8   .89 
Source: Computed from data in World Bank Indicators and UN 2003.
? Notwithstanding the point made above about on-the-job training, it takes time to raise 
the educational attainment of any country’s workforce as a whole, because more 
poorly educated older cohorts are only gradually replaced in the workforce by better-
educated younger cohorts. Examples for China and Pakistan make this point (Lutz 
and Goujon, 2001; Jones, 2000). 
? However, the “bottom line” is that the more rapid growth of numbers in the younger 
segments of the workforce in the “labour supply countries” such as the Philippines, 
Bangladesh and Indonesia than in the “labour receiving” countries such as Japan, 
South Korea and Singapore will be even more pronounced if we restrict the 
comparison to the better educated among these segments of the workforce, because of 
the more rapid educational expansion in the labour supply countries as they attempt to 
narrow the educational distance between themselves and the advanced countries.  
? In this sense, the potential supply of highly educated and skilled workers from the 
“labour supply” countries (including, of course, the giant countries – China and India) 
would seem to be almost unlimited. There is an important qualification, however, and 
that is that more years of secondary and tertiary education will not necessarily suffice; 
the quality and relevance of their education systems to the rather demanding 
requirements of the labour importing countries has to be nurtured.   
7. Growth and decline of labour force, changing employment structure and the 
incentive to migrate.
In considering the potential for international labour migration in the region, the 
growth of employment opportunities in non-agricultural employment is a key 
variable, because throughout the region there is a tendency for young people in rural 
areas to turn their backs on agriculture, either by seeking employment in non-
agricultural work in rural areas or by migrating to towns and cities. This is hardly 
surprising, as the agriculture sector is characterized by low productivity and low 
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earnings. Typically, in Asian countries, value added in agriculture is only between 10 
per cent and 40 per cent of value added in the industry and services sectors, and 
wages or earnings are typically only about half as great (Asian Development Bank, 
2005: Tables 2.4 and 2.5). Table 9 shows that agricultural employment now provides 
a very small proportion of total employment in Japan and South Korea, and less than 
a quarter in Malaysia. In China, Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia, its share has 
generally fallen well below half, whereas in India and Bangladesh it remains close to 
two thirds.
 Table 9.  Agricultural employment as % of total employment, various 
 countries 
Country 1995 male 2004 male 1995 female 2004 female 
Japan   5.2   4.4   6.5   4.7 
South Korea 10.9   7.3 14.6   9.3 
Taipei, China 10 7 Included in male Included in male 
China 48.5 44.1 Included in male Included in male 
Malaysia 25.8 n.a. 21.6 n.a.
Thailand 50.8 43.9 53.4 40.3
Philippines 51.7 44.6 31.1 24.7
Indonesia 44.1   43.3* 43.8 43.1*
India n.a.     66.7** n.a. Included in male 
Bangladesh n.a.     62.1** n.a. Included in male 
 Source: ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics.  
 * 1999   ** Latest available year; source is ILO, 2005, Table 1.6.
Earnings of those in employment do not fully reveal the pressures on those in the 
workforce to seek better opportunities. Unemployment is a major concern throughout 
the region, and unemployment rates in several East and Southeast Asian countries 
remain considerably higher than they were in 1996, prior to the economic crisis 
(Asian Development Bank, 2005: 23). The share of informal sector employment has 
also increased since the crisis in countries such as Indonesia, Philippines and 
Thailand, and remains very high in India despite improved economic growth there.      
To summarize, then, the problem for labour markets throughout the Asian region is 
not that they have failed to create jobs; but that the growth in number of entrants to 
the labour market is outpacing job creation, particularly in the modern sector of the 
economy.    
The potential for international labour migration has much to do with the rate of 
increase in employment opportunities in sectors where young people want to work, in 
relation to the rate of growth of the labour force. Stahl (2003, Table 2.5) conducted an 
exercise where he compared the growth of non-agricultural wage employment in 
various countries with the projected rate of growth of their labour force to estimate 
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the number of non-agricultural wage jobs per 100 extra members of the labour force.3
Assuming that the growth rate of non-agricultural wage employment from the mid-
1980s to the mid-1990s would continue unchanged, he found that this would be rapid 
enough to absorb only 56 per cent of the extra labour force in Bangladesh, 30 per cent 
in Indonesia and 75 per cent in the Philippines, though in China and Thailand it could 
more than absorb all additional workers. I attempted a similar approach, and updated 
Stahl’s calculations using more recent data and adding an additional country (India). 
Unfortunately, data on non-agricultural wage employment was available for only a 
few countries. For these countries, the results were startling. In China and India, non-
agricultural wage employment actually fell over the period 1995-2003, reinforcing 
Stahl’s conclusion that strong pressures exist to migrate overseas, because few 
opportunities exist in the kinds of employment most desired by labour force entrants. 
In the Philippines, however, non-agricultural wage employment did rise substantially 
over the period (by 41 per cent).
Both because of the unavailability of data on non-agricultural wage employment for 
most countries in the ILO database, and because the China and India trends differed 
so radically from those in the Philippines, I took a broader approach than Stahl to 
what constitutes acceptable jobs, and compared trends in total non-agricultural 
employment, on the assumption that it was non-agricultural employment in general 
that was desired by most labour force entrants, even though much of it would be in 
less desirable informal sector jobs. The key point about this simple exercise is that it 
is based on recent past performance in one variable: the annual growth rate of non-
agricultural employment of all kinds, and projection of the annual growth of the 
labour force, to estimate, on the basis of past performance, what proportion of 
projected additions to the labour force might reasonably be expected to find non-
agricultural employment.  
Table 10 shows the results. Column E shows that of the countries with available data, 
only in Indonesia did the growth rate of non-agricultural employment fall well short 
of the projected increase in the size of the labour force, and in China and the 
Philippines just short of it. In all three countries, however, we know that a substantial 
share of non-agricultural employment is in the kind of work that is not at all desired 
by new workers. Therefore the data serve to support the conclusion that there will 
continue to be strong pressures for outmigration, as workers seek better opportunities 
elsewhere.
One key to reducing emigration pressures would be a reduction in labour force 
growth rates in combination with an effective development strategy, yielding greater 
gains in domestic employment opportunities. Even this, however, would not 
necessarily stem the flow of workers overseas. The data presented earlier on wage 
differentials indicated the enormous attraction of the economies of the wealthier 
Asian countries for ambitious workers from the poorer economies.    
3 Stahl actually uses the expression “per 100 new labour force entrants”, but I would prefer to use the 
term “per 100 extra members of the labour force”, because those taking these non-agricultural wage jobs 
will not necessarily all be new labour force entrants. 
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 Table 10.  Projected growth of non-agricultural employment in selected 
labour-exporting countries,
Country Non-agricultural 
employment (per 
cent of total 
employment) 
2003
Annual growth 
of non-
agricultural
employment 
(1995-2003)
Annual
growth of 
labour force 
2000-2005
(per cent) 
Projected non-
agricultural
jobs per 100 
additions to 
labour force
A B C D E 
China 55.9 2.4 1.4 96 
Indonesia 55.7 1.9 1.8 59 
Philippines 62.8 4.1 2.6 99 
Thailand  55.1 2.5 1.2 115 
Vietnam 43.6 5.5 2.3 104 
Notes: Column E: Column B x C, and this result is divided by Column D. 
Source: International Labour Organization, LABOURSTA Statistics Database, Geneva, 2006
8. Japan as the prime destination for intra-Asian labour migration  
Of all the countries in the world with very low fertility, Japan faces some of the most 
intractable problems of declining labour supply (McDonald and Kippen, 2001). 
Raising fertility rates would have little effect on the size of Japan’s labour force over 
the next 20 years. Nor is Japan likely to be able to raise male participation rates very 
much, as these are already high by world standards. This leaves Japan with only two 
options if it wants to substantially increase its labour supply: increasing the labour 
force participation rates of Japanese women and increasing immigration. On the 
latter, Japan is a very homogeneous society and has difficulty coming to terms with 
the need for an increase in permanent migration. On the former, as noted in Section 4, 
participation rates of Japanese women are already reasonably high, and a declining 
proportion of Japanese women are quitting the workforce at the time of marriage 
(Retherford, Ogawa and Matsukura, 2001: 78-83). By increasing the proportion of 
women in full-time rather than part-time work, there is scope for increasing the 
equivalent full-time LFPRs for women. But this would require painful adjustment in 
Japanese family systems, otherwise this increase in equivalent full-time work could 
perhaps only be achieved at the expense of further declines in Japan’s fertility rates, 
thus exacerbating the problem of future declines in the size of the labour force.       
Japan, then, will clearly be a prime target for future migration from other Asian 
countries, whether permanent or temporary. Bolstering the demographic realities 
underlying this conclusion is the extreme attractiveness of Japan to potential labour 
migrants from many other Asian countries, where earnings in equivalent occupations 
are so much less.  
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9. The special situation of China and India 
Containing as they do 62 per cent of Asia’s total population, the situation of the 
population “giants”, China and India, deserves special mention. Neither country has 
so far contributed to international migration streams in anywhere near the proportion 
they share of the region’s population. Neighbouring countries such as the Philippines 
and Bangladesh are overrepresented in such migration streams. But will this continue 
to be the case in future? The answer to this question is critical, because even quite 
modest increases in the prevalence of labour migration from China and India could 
impact massively on the overall extent of international labour migration in the Asian 
region.
It has been argued that formerly, India and China were effectively not part of the 
global workforce, but that with India’s turn from autarchy, the PRC’s shift to market 
capitalism and the collapse of communism in the Soviet bloc, the global workforce 
effectively doubled (Asian Development Bank, 2005: 22). This has happened at 
precisely the moment technology has made geographical location less important. One 
could expect that eventually, Indian and Chinese workers would become increasingly 
mobile in the global labour market. The key uncertainty is how quickly this 
eventuality will come to pass.    
Internal population mobility is not particularly low for either country, though it 
certainly was low in China, for policy reasons, before the freeing up of the economy 
beginning in 1978. International migration from China has also increased since these 
economic reforms, and especially since the liberalization of migration with the 
emigration law of 1985 (Pieke, 1998). International migration from India is also 
building up. Thus the considerable internal migration in both countries certainly could 
translate into high levels of international migration, under favourable conditions.  
Still, it can be argued that China and India are likely to remain underrepresented in 
international migration flows, relative to their populations, for the following reasons. 
First, both countries are vast geographically, with varied economic situations in 
different regions; therefore employment opportunities can be sought within-country. 
Secondly, both countries have been experiencing very rapid economic growth, which 
is likely to continue for some time. Thus employment opportunities are opening up 
domestically. Thirdly, both countries are facing relatively slow growth in numbers in 
the potential labour force (see Table 5). This is especially the case in China, where 
growth in numbers aged 15-24 has already ceased and will soon decline.  
This is not to deny that there is still a good deal of surplus labour in both countries 
(symbolized by the so-called “floating population” in China) and barriers in both 
countries to gaining employment by migrating domestically – barriers of legal status 
of the “floating population” in the case of China, barriers of language and ethnic 
differences in both countries, and barriers posed by “sons of the soil” policies in India 
(Weiner, 1978). Changes in the domestic situation in both countries – in particular, 
slowdowns in their impressive rates of economic growth – could certainly release vast 
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numbers of workers onto the international labour market. Movement of Chinese 
workers to Singapore - a relatively attractive destination, to be sure, because of its 
high wages and Mandarin-speaking population – provides an illustration of what 
could happen elsewhere. Tourism is building up rapidly from China to other parts of 
Asia, thus exposing Chinese to the opportunities that are available elsewhere. 
Moreover, when a country such as China in which economic and social development 
had been held back and international movement was restricted by government policy 
enter an unprecedented period of rapid growth, even the fact that employment 
opportunities are increasing rapidly domestically will not necessarily prevent a large 
flow of young workers, enticed by previously unavailable opportunities, abroad. Thus 
the situation needs to be monitored carefully.
10. Other factors influencing migration patterns  
International marriage migration
This is influenced by “marriage squeeze” (relative shortage of one sex compared with 
the other among the age and socio-economic groups that typically marry each other) 
in different countries. In many countries of East and Southeast Asia, non-marriage is 
especially prevalent among highly educated women and lesser educated men (Jones, 
2004: 11). Female education has been expanding rapidly in Asian countries, and the 
proportion of girls proceeding into higher education is much higher than in the past, 
and in some cases (Philippines, Singapore) higher than for males. The reality is that 
educated females generally want to marry educated males – and less educated males 
are reluctant to marry females who are better educated than they are. Also, males tend 
to marry women younger than they are, and will sometimes choose beauty over 
brains. This means that the relatively restricted pool of potential husbands for the 30-
something educated women will not necessarily choose the 30-something educated 
woman for marriage.  
For males, the group having difficulty finding brides tends to be the less educated 
with relatively poor employment prospects. High percentages remaining single for 
this group have been observed in a number of countries in East and Southeast Asia. 
Their problems are exacerbated in countries such as China, Taiwan and South Korea 
by the increasing sex ratios at birth, and therefore an overall shortage of females in 
the cohorts moving into the marriageable ages (Hudson and Boer, 2004).    
The search overseas for wives by men disadvantaged in the local marriage market – 
or dissatisfied with the product available in local marriage markets - is an increasing 
phenomenon in Taiwan (Tsay 2004), but it is also evident in South Korea and 
Singapore (where there are a number of companies organizing matchmaking tours to 
Vietnam). From studies on the distorted sex ratios at birth in some East Asian 
countries, as well as in India, we can infer that the imbalance in the male/female 
ratios in the marriageable ages in these countries will worsen over the next decade or 
two (Riley, 2004: 17-20). In the case of China, the gender imbalances were actually 
marked around 2000, but have now disappeared, only to re-emerge in extreme form 
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over the 2015-2025 period, not only because of imbalances in sex ratios at birth, but 
even more importantly because of age structure changes consequent on earlier 
fluctuations in fertility rates (Goodkind, 2006).
In countries where large numbers of single people are abroad as labour migrants – the 
Philippines is a prime example – the local marriage markets are likely to be 
significantly affected. Overseas labour migration in this case is likely to further delay 
marriage in many cases, as well as leading to greater instability in marriage due to the 
strains of long absences.
For the purposes of the present discussion, one important point to note is that in the 
case of women moving from countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines to 
countries in East Asia, it is not always possible to separate marriage migration from 
labour migration (Piper and Roces, 2003). Overall, we can expect the pressures for 
international marriage migration (from both the male side in countries such as Korea 
and Taiwan and the female side in countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam) to 
increase. It is unlikely that the ambivalent situation (wife or worker) of many of these 
women, documented by Piper and Roces, will change. Female marriage migration 
must therefore be considered as in some sense a component part of the pattern of 
labour migration occurring in the region.   
Cohort succession 
One other point having a bearing on the demand and supply of labour in Asian 
countries is that in cases where fertility has not declined smoothly, effects on the size 
of age groups in successive periods can be quite dramatic. In some cases there have 
been ‘pauses’ in fertility decline and in others, even a rise followed by a renewal of 
decline. Examples of such rises include Japan immediately after World War II, China 
from 1962 onwards, following the low fertility of the famine years 1959-61, Iran in 
the late 1970s to late 1980s, Singapore from 1986 to 1993 and Malays in Malaysia 
from 1978 to 1986.  
Cohort succession can lead to sharply differing growth rates of different age groups 
within the population. For example, in Japan, the cohort born between 1947 and 1949 
is 30 to 50 per cent larger than those born in the 3-year periods immediately before 
and after that. This cohort will be retiring en masse from 2007 onwards, as it begins 
to reach the retirement age of 60, sharply raising the number of pension recipients, 
and exacerbating the shortage of workers and the possibility of “mismatch” between 
the skills and experience of those leaving and the job seekers replacing them. Another 
example is Singapore, where the age group 5-14 declined between 1980 and 1990, 
rose by almost 30 per cent between 1990 and 2000, and is expected to decline again 
over both of the following two decades. Moreover, while numbers in this age group 
were increasing sharply over the 1990-2000 period, those in age group 15-24 were 
declining sharply. Temporary rises in fertility can lead to “echo effects” in age 
structure caused by an increase in births when these larger birth cohorts enter the 
main reproductive ages. These “echo effects” can be amplified or dampened, 
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depending on the particular trajectory followed by fertility rates over the course of 
cohort transition.
Planners, and academic economists, frequently ignore age structure effects (for 
example, some influential economic growth models assume the rate of growth of the 
labour force is the same as the rate of growth of the population). But the scale of the 
shifts is large enough to be taken seriously into account in the planning process (see 
Pool, 1994; Tuljapurkar et al, 2005). Both the initial fluctuations in numbers in given 
age groups as different sized cohorts succeed each other in the age structure, and any 
subsequent “echo effects” can have important implications for educational and 
employment planning, and for changing needs for foreign workers over fairly short 
periods of time.   
12.  Conclusions 
Nothing can be more certain than that flows of labour migrants – both highly skilled 
and unskilled – will continue to increase in the Asian region. The economic and 
demographic realities outlined early in this paper ensure this. The only question then 
becomes whether these flows will be able to occur legally – through the freeing up of 
labour markets in the region – or will increasingly be undocumented and – from the 
point of view of receiving countries – illegal. These points will be expanded in the 
following, final paragraphs of this paper.
Population dynamics remain important variables influencing economic growth 
(Birdsall et al., 2001). In the Asian region, diversity in population trends has meant 
that some countries have benefited more than others from the “demographic bonus” 
(the decades-long decline in the ratio of dependants to workers following decline in 
fertility from high levels). The diversity in economic and demographic conditions in 
Asian countries at the present time lies at the heart of the issue of projecting future 
migratory movements in the region. Labour migration is intimately linked to labour 
shortages occasioned by fertility trends in the wealthy countries, and to the glaring 
gap between income levels in countries such as Bangladesh and Japan (an extreme 
comparison) or Indonesia and Malaysia.   
Labour migration is increasingly an issue in the Asian region. Its scale is increasing, 
and it influences the de facto population situation in the recipient countries. 
Singapore, Taiwan and the state of Sabah in Malaysia are good examples. However, 
migration of all kinds – labour migration, skilled temporary migration and migration 
for permanent settlement – are all likely to increase in the region in the near future. 
The chasm separating earnings between countries of the region will ensure a steady 
flow of labour migrants. The imminent decline in the labour force in a number of East 
Asian countries (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore) will require increasing 
reliance on overseas workers, at both ends of the skill spectrum, and the European 
debates on ‘replacement migration’ will have increasing resonance in the region 
(Demeny, 2003).              
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Population mobility in the region raises important issues for human welfare. Given 
that large-scale flows of people are certain to be taking place, the key issue is the 
conditions under which these flows will occur. Most importantly, the question is the 
extent to which labour regulations and agreements can be brought about to enable 
these flows to occur in a monitored and regulated way, rather than occurring 
irregularly (“illegally”) and in conditions assisting the role of labour brokers and (in 
extreme cases) traffickers.  
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